BAR ASSN. v. COPPERMAN, 173 Ohio St. 330 (1962)


181 N.E.2d 903

LAKE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. COPPERMAN.

D.D. No. 28Supreme Court of Ohio.
Decided April 25, 1962.

Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Disciplinary action — Discipline administered — Disbarment.

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.

The relator, the Lake County Bar Association, filed a complaint against the respondent, Sol C. Copperman, charging him with having engaged in a course of conduct in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics and setting forth six specific charges of misconduct: (1) Endorsing and negotiating checks payable to his clients without the authority or consent of such clients; (2) in five instances charging exhorbitant fees to his clients in complete disregard of oral assurances as to what such fees would be; (3) circulating bar association pamphlets to persons not his clients; (4) after filing suit against a client for fees, lulling the client into a false sense of security, by reason of which she failed to enter a defense, thus permitting a default judgment to be taken against her, and thereupon employing dubious collection techniques to harass such client; (5) falsely advising his clients of the status of a suit against them and falsely verifying a pleading on their behalf; (6) seeking to charge and threatening garnishment proceedings against a client for $500 for looking over and filing two applications and certificates of transfer of real estate, not prepared by him, and further charging expenses for the photostating of records in Probate Court, which photostating was not actually done and which would have been unnecessary in any event; and (7) engaging in a general course of conduct in violation of his oath as an attorney and in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

A hearing was had before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. The board found that respondent was admitted to the Bar of Ohio in 1928, commenced the practice of law in Cleveland and continued such practice there until 1939, at which time the Common Pleas Court of that county disbarred him from the practice of law in all courts of record in the state; that on October 26, 1945, in the same cause, the court modified its judgment to provide for a suspension and reinstated

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him; that respondent then began the practice of law in Lake County; and that on November 21, 1949, the Common Pleas Court of that county entered a decree, to which the respondent consented, suspending him from the practice of law for a period of three months.

The board found further:

As to charge No. 1, that respondent, as attorney, collected from the former husband of his client payments due under court order, made by checks payable to his client, and without authority of his client endorsed the checks and applied part of the proceeds to the payment of attorney fees owing to him by his client, and that he endorsed checks payable to another client, without the client’s consent, and retained part of the proceeds of the checks for payment of attorney fees, all in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

As to charge No. 2, that respondent, as attorney for five named clients, represented that his charges for services would likely be the minimum fees represented but had his clients execute written contracts providing for an hourly rate of compensation and subsequently billed them for substantially more than the minimum fees and in some instances overstated the number of hours actually spent in such representation, and that such conduct violated the Canons of Professional Ethics.

As to charge No. 3, that respondent circulated by mail certain pamphlets, published by the Ohio State Bar Association, in envelopes showing his name, occupation and address, and also reprints from an article known as, “Got a Family Lawyer,” and that these mailings were to clients, friends and acquaintances, a mailing list of approximately 500 names, and were used for solicitation of business in violation of Rule XXVIII of the Supreme Court and Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.

Charge No. 4 was dismissed as it was not sufficiently supported.

As to charge No. 5, that respondent caused answers to be filed on behalf of two clients, which he verified under oath as attorney on the basis that the clients were temporarily absent from the county, whereas, in fact, they were not absent and respondent did not exercise due care or good faith in determining

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whether such clients were available, and that such conduct violated the Canons of Professional Ethics.

As to charge No. 6, that respondent did not seek to charge his client for services alleged, and that the acts did not constitute misconduct as defined in Section 5 of Rule XXVII of this court.

As to charge No. 7, that respondent did engage in a general course of conduct in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics notwithstanding previous disciplinary action for violations of his oath as an attorney and of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and that, “in view of the fact this complaint is based upon the six specific complaints heretofore specially decided, the specific conclusions set forth above concerning the same are hereby confirmed.”

The matter is now before this court for consideration of the report of the board of commissioners and the objections of the respondent.

Mr. Joseph P. Tulley, Mr. Charles E. Cannon, Mr. Ralph V. Greene and Mr. Edward R. Ostrander, for relator.

Mr. Milton L. Farber and Messrs. Donaldson Colegrove, for respondent.

Per Curiam.

From a careful examination of the record, and considering the long continued course of conduct of respondent, his disbarment in 1939, and, after modification of the judgment to suspension and his reinstatement in 1945, his suspension from the practice of law in 1949, this court is of the opinion that the discipline to be administered should be a permanent disbarment, and it is so ordered.

Judgment accordingly.

WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, TAFT, MATTHIAS, BELL GRIFFITH and O’NEILL, JJ., concur.

GRIFFITH, J., of the Seventh Appellate District, sitting by designation in the place and stead of HERBERT, J.

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