231 N.E.2d 176
No. 260218Court of Common Pleas, Summit County.
Decided March 4, 1967.
Appellate Procedure Act — “Law” construed — Section 2505.07, Revised Code — Appeal from city board of zoning appeals to Common Pleas Court — Time for perfecting — City ordinance provision invalid, when.
1. The word “law” as used in the phrase, “unless otherwise provided by law” (Section 2505.07, Revised Code), means a state statute and not a municipal ordinance.
2. Appeals to the Court of Common Pleas from orders of a city Board of Zoning Appeals must be perfected within ten (10) days as provided by Section 2505.07 (B), Revised Code. Provisions in a city ordinance granting thirty (30) days in which to perfect such appeal are invalid.
Mr. Robert D. Moss, for appellant.
Mr. Adam Gadanac, Jr., for appellee.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal from an order of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the city of Barberton, Ohio. This order of the board was made and entered on or about September 15, 1966. Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed in the Common Pleas Court on October 1, 1966.
The board filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that the court did not acquire jurisdiction of said appeal for the reason said appeal was not filed within ten (10) days from the order of the board as required by Section 2505.07 (B), Revised Code.
Appellant contends that the ten-day requirement is not applicable to it in that Section 2505.07, Revised Code, provides that when it is “otherwise provided by law” more time may be had to perfect an appeal and it contends that it has been “otherwise provided by law” by virtue of Section 1183.11, Barberton Zoning Code, which grants one appealing from the decision of the board thirty (30) days in which to perfect an appeal.
What does the language, “unless otherwise provided by law,” in Section 2505.07, Revised Code, mean?
While there is no case exactly in point several cases indicate that when the word “law” is used, it means a state statute and not a municipal ordinance. See Village of Brewster
v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 354; Washington Fidelity National Ins. Co. v. Herbert, 49 Ohio App. 151; City of Dayton v. Adams, 3 Ohio App.2d 126; State, ex rel. Monnett, Atty. Genl., v McMillan, 15 C. C. 163, 8 C. D. 380.
Furthermore it must be recognized that there are several administrative appeal procedure acts in Ohio. See France, The Administrative Appeal — Ohio’s Jurisdictional Morass, 39 Ohio Bar 1435, December 19, 1966. The provisions of the Appellate Procedure Act (of which Section 2505.07, Revised Code, is a part) are not applicable, generally, to those appeals. See 1 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 548, Administrative Law and Procedure, Section 168.
Many of these acts provide specifically the time limit in which an appeal may be perfected. When it is thus “otherwise provided by law” the provisions of Section 2505.07, Revised Code, do not apply. When no time limit is specified in such act the provisions of Section 2505.07, Revised Code, do apply. 1 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, 548, Section 168.
The language “otherwise provided by law” refers then, only to those administrative appeal procedure acts now in effect, or which may be hereafter enacted.
Moreover, the Appellate Procedure Act is a statute of general application. See Eggers v. Morr, 162 Ohio St. 521, at 527. It is difficult to see that such a statute could be in any way affected by a local ordinance. In Summit County alone we have a number of Boards of Zoning Appeal. If Section 2505.07, Revised Code, could be modified or changed by ordinance there could be as many different periods of time in which to perfect an appeal as there are boards of zoning appeal in the county.
The Legislature could only have intended in this court’s opinion to have Section 2505.07, Revised Code, modified or changed by a statute of general application throughout the state rather than by local law or ordinances.
The appeal, therefore, is dismissed with exceptions to the appellant.