480 N.E.2d 436
D.D. No. 82-9Supreme Court of Ohio.
Decided July 10, 1985.
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Permanent disbarment — Knowing conversion of property — Neglect of legal matters — Conversion of estate funds.
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Bar.
The Bar Association of Greater Cleveland, relator herein, filed a five-count complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline against respondent, Paula Tia Cook. Count One involved respondent’s conviction in United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, of knowingly converting property held by the Small Business Administration to her own use with intent to defraud in violation of Section 645(c), Title 15, U.S. Code. Count One alleged misconduct involving illegal conduct, moral turpitude, dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) and (6).
Count Two concerned respondent’s representation of Donald See, Jr., Executor of the Estate of Lawnie Sawyer, deceased. Count Two alleged misconduct by respondent in failing to advise the executor of his rights and responsibilities regarding the filing of accountings and thereby neglecting a legal matter entrusted to her. Further, Count Two alleged that respondent borrowed some $10,000 from the estate and placed it in her personal bank accounts in three states resulting in its attachment by her creditors. Count Two alleges that this conduct violates Disciplinary Rules which prohibit acquiring a proprietary interest in a cause of action, entering into a business transaction with a client who has different interests, and in commingling client funds. Finally, Count Two alleges that respondent refused to cooperate in the investigation of her alleged misconduct. Relator contended that these actions violated DR 5-103(A), 5-104(A), 6-101(A)(3), 9-102(A) and (B)(4), and Gov. Bar R. V(4).
Count Three involved respondent’s representation of Lenora Goins, Administratrix W.W.A. of the Estate of William Powell, in the administration of the estate. Count Three alleged misconduct by respondent in obtaining a personal loan from the administratrix out of estate funds, which loan she was unable to repay according to the agreed terms; in accepting from the administratrix the sum of $4,000, which she represented as the cost of a fiduciary bond which in reality amounted to only $400; and in failing to pay a court-ordered judgment obtained against the administratrix, despite twice having been given funds to make such payment, all in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6), 5-103(A) and 9-102(B)(4). Count Three further alleged misconduct in respondent’s failure and refusal to cooperate in the investigation of her alleged misconduct in violation of Gov. Bar R. V(4).
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Count Four involved respondent’s representation of Helen Johnson, Guardian of the Person and Estate of George D. Johnson. It alleged misconduct by respondent in taking estate funds in the amount of $4,000 with the ostensible purpose of investing them for the estate and then using the funds for solely personal purposes — all in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6), 5-103(A) and 9-102(B)(4).
Count Five alleges that respondent’s consistent course of misconduct, whether or not motivated by dishonesty, fraud, or deceit, adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law in violation of DR 1-102(A)(6).
The first hearing on this complaint was held before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (the “board”) on October 30, 1981. Service of the complaint and the notice of this hearing was accomplished by serving the Clerk of the Ohio Supreme Court pursuant to Gov. Bar R. V(31). Attempted service on respondent at her last known address was returned as undeliverable and unforwardable. Respondent did not appear at the October 30, 1981 hearing. On February 1, 1982, the board filed its findings of fact and recommendation that suggested that respondent be permanently disbarred from the practice of law. On February 2, 1982, this court issued an order for the respondent to show cause.
On March 23, 1982, respondent filed a motion for rehearing, and she appeared with relator for oral argument before the Supreme Court on May 25, 1982. On June 2, 1982, the Supreme Court remanded the case for “effective service and a hearing.” On June 15, 1982, the board again served relator’s complaint on respondent.
On March 4, 1983, the board served the respondent with a copy of a notice of formal hearing for April 18, 1983. The Clerk of the Supreme Court was also served. On March 7, 1983, respondent sent a telegram to the board chairman requesting a continuance of the April 18, 1983 hearing. The board granted the continuance. On March 21, 1983, respondent sent the board a letter requesting an additional continuance because of alleged physical problems. On April 6, 1983, the board sent a notice of formal hearing resetting same for June 10, 1983. On May 26, 1983, respondent sent the board a telegram requesting another continuance for purposes of obtaining a psychiatric exam pursuant to Gov. Bar R. V(10)(c). On June 6, 1983, that continuance was granted.
No psychiatric report was received or filed by respondent. On January 17, 1984, the board filed a notice of hearing setting the date of February 20, 1984. Notice was sent to respondent, but the certified mail letter came back “unclaimed.” The Clerk of the Supreme Court was also served with the notice. On February 15, 1984, the board sua sponte continued the hearing date. On May 14, 1984, the board filed a notice of formal hearing setting same for June 8, 1984. The Clerk of the Supreme Court was also served. On May 30, 1984, respondent sent a telegram to the board requesting another continuance. On May 31, 1984, the board denied the continuance.
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On June 8, 1984, a hearing was held before the board. Respondent was not present, but her attorney, Thomas Kontos, called the board at the time of the hearing. He stated that he had been retained by respondent the night before, but admitted that respondent had contacted him several months before the June 8, 1984 hearing seeking to have him represent her at her hearing and that respondent was aware of the setting of the dates of the hearing. The board denied the attorney’s request for a continuance and proceeded with the hearing.
On July 24, 1984, the board filed its report finding respondent to have violated DR 1-102(A)(3), (4) and (6), 5-103(A), 5-104(A), 6-101(A)(3), and 9-102(A) and (B)(4), and recommending that respondent be permanently disbarred. An order to show cause was filed on July 26, 1984. On August 27, 1984, respondent filed her objections to the report.
Peter H. Weinberger and Michael I. Shapero, for relator.
Paula T. Cook, pro se, and Rozetta Darby McDowell, for respondent.
Per Curiam.
Respondent’s objections to the board’s findings and recommendation center on her contention that she has been denied due process because she was not given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to defend. This argument is meritless. Respondent was given every opportunity to defend herself at the hearing before the board. Since the court remanded this case in June 1982, respondent was granted no less than five extensions of time or continuances to prepare her case. Her own attorney admitted respondent had notice of the setting of hearings in this case for several months prior to June 8, 1984. The board allowed respondent the time from June 15, 1982 to June 8, 1984 within which to prepare her defense. In that two-year period, respondent changed addresses at least four times and failed to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court of these changes. Therefore, respondent’s objections regarding notice and opportunity to defend are overruled.
Respondent has neither produced any evidence in defense of relator’s complaint nor stated with specificity how the evidence produced by relator fails to sustain the burden of proof of respondent’s professional misconduct. This court has carefully reviewed the record in this case and concurs in the findings and recommendation of the board.
Accordingly, it is the judgment of this court that respondent be permanently disbarred from the practice of law.
Judgment accordingly.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
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