BARTLETT v. BARTLETT, 176 Ohio St. 299 (1964)


199 N.E.2d 586

BARTLETT, ADMX. v. BARTLETT; SUNDERLIN ET AL., APPELLEES, ESHELMAN ET AL., APPELLANTS.

No. 38263Supreme Court of Ohio.
Decided May 27, 1964.

Judgments — Vacation after term — Irregularities in obtaining judgment — Section 2325.01, Revised Code — Error in application of law to facts not ground for.

Error in the application of the law to the facts in the rendition of a judgment is judicial error and is a matter which must be raised by appeal and is not an irregularity in obtaining the judgment within the meaning of Section 2325.01, Revised Code, relating to the vacation of judgments after term.

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing a judgment of the Probate Court of Geauga County modifying and partially vacating its previous judgment determining heirship.

Gleason L. Zimmerman died on May 1, 1961, leaving a will

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which was inoperative because of the prior death of the designated beneficiary therein. The administration of the estate was begun on June 13, 1961. The administratrix, being uncertain as to the identity of the heirs, on July 18, 1961, filed her petition in the Probate Court for a determination of heirship, joining all known heirs and unknown heirs as defendants. Each named defendant signed a waiver of service and entry of appearance and joined in the request for the determination of heirship. Unknown heirs were served by publication.

The default date was September 16, 1961, on which date the court was furnished a family tree. On october 10, 1961, the court entered its judgment determining heirship and fixing the amount of the share of each. In November, a letter was sent to each heir showing his dollar share in the estate. In February 1962, a partial distribution was made.

On May 21, 1962, a motion was filed by six heirs, appellants herein, to correct the judgment of the court, on the basis that it erroneously listed the shares to which the heirs on the maternal side of the deceased were entitled. Four heirs, appellees herein, filed a motion to strike appellants’ motion on the basis that it was not timely filed, it having been filed seven months after the original judgment and after the term in which such judgment had been entered. Appellees’ motion was overruled, and the court, finding that its previous judgment was contrary to Snodgrass v. Bedell, 134 Ohio St. 311, partially vacated and modified its former judgment, redetermining the shares of certain heirs.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court found that the Probate Court had no power to vacate or modify its former judgment and that the judgment of vacation and modification was contrary to law and reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to the Probate Court with instructions to reinstate its entry of judgment of October 10, 1961.

Messrs. Woodbury Hendershott, for Helen N. Bartlett, administratrix.

Messrs. McIntosh McIntosh and Messrs. Henry Hoffstetter, for appellees.

Messrs. Laribee Cooper, for appellants.

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MATTHIAS, J.

The primary question presented by this appeal is whether a trial court on discovering after term that it made an error in its application of the law in its judgment may on motion by a party vacate such judgment and enter a new one.

This cause arose as a proceeding to determine heirship during the administration of an estate. Generally the administration of an estate is a continuing process until the termination thereof by the approval of the final account. However, a proceeding to determine heirship, although it occurs during and might be said to be a part of the administration of the estate, nevertheless is a special proceeding subject to all the rules of civil procedure, including those relating to vacation of judgments and appeals.

In the present case, the court erred in its application of the law to the facts and on such basis vacated and modified its prior judgment after term.

The power of a court to vacate or modify its own final judgments after term is not unlimited, but in the absence of a void judgment it is limited and governed by the provisions of Section 2325.01, Revised Code, which sets forth the authority of the court and the grounds upon which it may vacate a judgment after term. Section 2101.33, Revised Code, provides that “the Probate Court has the same power as the Court of Common Pleas to vacate or modify its orders or judgments.” The pertinent parts of Section 2325.01 in relation to the present case are as follows:

“The Court of Common Pleas or the Court of Appeals may vacate or modify its own final order, judgment, or decree after the term at which it was made:

“* * *

“(C) For mistake, neglect, or omission of the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order * * *.”

There was no mistake, neglect or omission by the clerk in the instant case. The only question is whether there was an irregularity in obtaining the judgment.

The Probate Court determined that it erred in its application of the law to the facts, and, thus, the basic question which must be determined is whether such judicial error constitutes

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an irregularity for which a judgment may be vacated after term.

Irregularities for which a judgment may be vacated after term as contemplated by Section 2325.01, Revised Code, relate to a failure to adhere to the prescribed rule or mode of procedure for the orderly administration of justice, either in failing to do something that is necessary for the orderly conduct of the action or doing it at an unseasonable time or in an improper manner. Such an irregularity must appear on the face of the record and be something which, although it does not render the judgment void, does affect the basic validity of the judgment. Ealy v. McGahen, 37 N.M. 246, 21 P.2d 84; Babb v. City of Wichita, 172 Kan. 416, 241 P.2d 755; Carr v. Carr (Mo.), 253 S.W.2d 191; In re Ellern, 23 Wn.2d 219, 160 P.2d 639; Wooten v Friedberg, 355 Mo., 756, 198 S.W.2d 1; Anchor Savings Loan Assn. v. Dysart, 189 Kan. 147, 368 P.2d 293; and Becker v Roothe, 184 Kan. 830, 339 P.2d 292.

Error in the application of the law to the facts in the rendition of a judgment is judicial error and is a matter which must be raised by appeal and is not an irregularity in obtaining the judgment within the meaning of Section 2325.01, Revised Code, relating to the vacation of judgments after term. Ealy v McGahen, supra; State, ex rel. Caplow, v. Kirkwood, Judge
(Mo.App.), 117 S.W.2d 652; and 1 Freeman on Judgments, 434, Section 221.

Appellants contend also that the failure to send each heir a copy of the journal entry constituted an irregularity for which the judgment should be set aside. There is no statute or rule which requires a court to supply the parties with copies of its entries. The parties herein were aware that the court had acted, and the burden was upon them to investigate the court’s holding and to raise promptly any objection which they might have to such holding.

Appellants raise also questions as to the improper designation of the relationship of certain of the heirs and the filing of the family tree after the petition was filed instead of attaching it to the petition. The court, prior to the time it entered into a consideration of this matter, had a full statement of all

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the facts, including the family tree. There was no irregularity in this respect which would affect the validity of the judgment.

The final argument of appellants is that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the judgment of the Probate Court, on the ground that it was contrary to law, without first making a finding that the judgment was against the weight of the evidence.

The Court of Appeals found, as a matter of law, that the Probate Court exceeded its powers when it vacated the judgment. There was no disputed question of fact involved. The appeal was concerned strictly with questions of law. By making its finding, there was no need for the Court of Appeals to weigh the evidence; it would have been a useless act since the court found as a matter of law that the Probate Court did not have the power to vacate the judgment.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

TAFT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, O’NEILL, GRIFFITH, HERBERT and GIBSON, JJ., concur.

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