CARLYN v. OHIO DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 62 Ohio Misc.2d 281 (1991)


598 N.E.2d 231

CARLYN v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES et al.

No. 90-05562.Court of Claims of Ohio.
Decided May 24, 1991.

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Ronald J. Koehler, for plaintiff.

Lee Fisher, Attorney General, and Stephanie D. Pestello-Sharf, Assistant Attorney General, for defendants.

SHOEMAKER, Judge.

On July 12, 1989, at approximately 11:35 a.m., a collision occurred between an automobile driven by plaintiff, Nancy Carlyn, and one operated by Teddy L. Scherff. Scherff was operating a pick-up truck while in the scope and course of his employment with defendant, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (“ODNR”). The accident occurred in Springfield Township, Summit County, Ohio, at the four-way intersection of U.S. Route 224, a parking lot exit of the Fair Lanes Bowling Alley, and Waterloo Road.

U.S. Route 224 is a four-lane divided highway that provides for east-west travel at forty-five miles per hour. The highway is divided by a concrete island, which measures approximately six to eight feet in width at the intersection. Waterloo Road is a two-lane residential street that runs northwest and southeast, but ends at the intersection with Route 224. The Fair Lanes Bowling Alley is located on the north side of U.S. Route 224, directly opposite from the end of Waterloo Road. The bowling alley has two lanes for entering and two lanes for exiting from its parking lot.

Traffic at the intersection was regulated by computer-controlled traffic signalling devices. There were a total of eight traffic control devices at this intersection arranged as follows: two traffic controls facing the west-bound

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traffic on U.S. Route 224; two traffic controls facing the east-bound traffic on U.S. Route 224; two traffic controls facing the north-bound Waterloo Road Traffic; and two traffic controls facing the bowling alley exit.

The automobile driven by plaintiff Carlyn was initially stopped in the bowling alley exit lane. When the traffic signal changed from red to green, she moved her vehicle northward into the intersection. Her intention was to proceed straight through the intersection onto south-bound Waterloo Road. However, rather than proceed across all four lanes of U.S. Route 224, she stopped her vehicle in the very first lane, which was the northernmost lane nearest to the bowling alley, to permit ten to twelve vehicles, entering the intersection from Waterloo Road, to make a left-hand turn in front of her onto west-bound U.S. Route 224.

While stopped, Carlyn could not see any of the traffic-control devices. When the signals changed, the west-bound traffic on U.S. Route 224 began to move toward her vehicle. She then realized that the traffic signals had changed to red for the parking lot and Waterloo Road traffic and green for the U.S. Route 224 traffic. She observed a dump truck stopped at the traffic-control signal in the northernmost lane of the east-bound portion of U.S. Route 224. Carlyn made eye contact with the driver of that dump truck and concluded that he was aware of her situation. She then promptly accelerated her vehicle across the remaining three lanes of U.S. Route 224 in an attempt to clear the intersection.

As Carlyn crossed the last lane of the intersection, which was the most southerly and closest to Waterloo Road, her vehicle was struck by the pick-up truck driven by Scherff. Scherff had been proceeding east on U.S. Route 224 and, as he approached the intersection, the traffic signal changed to green prior to Scherff’s entering the intersection. Neither Carlyn nor Scherff could see the other’s vehicle because of the location and size of the dump truck.

Carlyn claims that the actions of Scherff were negligent and the sole proximate cause of this accident. She relies on R.C. 4511.13.

R.C. 4511.13, signal lights, states that:

“Whenever traffic is controlled by traffic control signals exhibiting different colored lights, or colored lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combination, only the colors green, red, and yellow shall be used, except for special pedestrian signals carrying words or symbols, and said lights shall indicate and apply to drivers of vehicles, streetcars, and trackless trolleys, and to pedestrians as follows:

“(A) Green indication:

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“(1) Vehicular traffic, streetcars, and trackless trolleys facing a circular green signal may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn. But vehicular traffic, streetcars, and trackless trolleys, including vehicles, streetcars, and trackless trolleys turning right or left, shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles, streetcars, trackless trolleys, and pedestrian lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time such signal is exhibited.

“(2) Vehicular traffic, streetcars, and trackless trolleys facing a green arrow signal, shown alone or in combination with another indication, may cautiously enter the intersection only to make the movement indicated by such arrow, or such other movement as is permitted by other indications shown at the same time. Such vehicular traffic, streetcars, and trackless trolley shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection.” (Emphasis added.)

A vehicle that enters an intersection on a green traffic light has a preferential right, pursuant to R.C. 4511.13, to proceed through the intersection. However, this right is not absolute and does not relieve one of the duty to use ordinary care. Timmons v. Russomano (1968), 14 Ohio St.2d 124, 43 O.O.2d 186, 236 N.E.2d 665, followed in Woods v. Columbus (1985), 23 Ohio App.3d 163, 23 OBR 406, 492 N.E.2d 466.

Upon consideration of all the evidence, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Scherff was negligent in the operation of his vehicle at the time of this accident. Alternatively, if Scherff was negligent, then the negligence of the plaintiff exceeded any negligence by Scherff.

Carlyn exercised considerable caution by yielding her right of way to the ten or twelve other vehicles that turned left in front of her. Nevertheless, after recognizing that the east-west traffic was moving, probably in response to a change in traffic signals, she should have moved to the center of the highway and into the island area. Carlyn should have realized that the driver of the dump truck had no control over other oncoming vehicles, and proceeded cautiously past the waiting dump truck. Instead, hoping to clear the intersection, she accelerated across all three lanes, including one with an admittedly obstructed view. In this, she failed to exercise ordinary care.

Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff.

Judgment for defendants.

FRED J. SHOEMAKER, J., retired, of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, sitting by assignment.

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