620 N.E.2d 263

In re CROWLEY.

No. V91-99765.Court of Claims of Ohio, Victims of Crime Division.
Decided April 7, 1993.

Gary S. Okin, for the applicant.

Lee Fisher, Attorney General, for the state.

Page 132

OPINION AND ORDER OF THREE-COMMISSIONER PANEL.

This cause came to be heard before this panel of three commissioners on April 1, 1993 at 11:00 a.m. upon the Attorney General’s August 13, 1992 objection and notice of appeal to the July 30, 1992 decision of the single commissioner.

Neither the applicant, Mary C. Crowley, nor anyone on her behalf appeared at the hearing. The Attorney General attended the hearing and presented oral argument for this panel’s review and consideration. After a brief discussion of the claim, the panel chairman concluded the hearing.

The single commissioner had granted the applicant an award of reparations for allowable expense in the amount of $706.63, but denied work loss due to collateral source reimbursement. The Attorney General objected, contending the applicant’s allowable expense award should be reduced by an employment insurance overpayment that totaled $165.18. This contention was originally raised in the Attorney General’s May 5, 1992 finding of fact and recommendation. In rejecting the Attorney General’s recommendation concerning the collateral source overpayment, the single commissioner held as follows:

“The Attorney General recommends that this amount [$706.63] be reduced by an amount equal to the excess work loss benefits received by the applicant [$165.18]. However, there is no statute or precedent which justifies such a reduction.”

This panel does not agree.

In support of his contention that the excess work loss benefits should be deducted from allowable expense, the Attorney General cited In re Roseboom (1988), 61 Ohio Misc.2d 315, 578 N.E.2d 908. In Roseboom, a panel of three commissioners affirmed a determination of the single commissioner wherein the single commissioner set off excess allowable expense benefits against work loss. In affirming the single commissioner, the panel relied upon the prior determination in In re Smith (Oct. 14, 1982), Ct. of Cl. No. V80-41507jud, unreported, wherein excess collateral benefits were offset against dependent’s replacement services loss and dependent’s economic loss. While it is our opinion that both Smith and Roseboom are consistent with the Attorney General’s recommendation that excess work loss benefits be deducted from allowable expense, our determination does not turn upon the applicability of either precedent, but, rather, upon the plain meaning of the applicable statutory provisions. Therefore, we decline to speculate upon the single commissioner’s apparent rejection of those precedents.

R.C. 2743.51(E) defines “economic loss” as follows:

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“(E) `Economic loss’ means economic detriment consisting only of allowable expense, work loss, funeral expense, unemployment benefits loss, and replacement services loss. If criminally injurious conduct causes death, economic loss includes a dependent’s economic loss and a dependent’s replacement services loss. Noneconomic detriment is not economic loss; however, economic loss may be caused by pain and suffering or physical impairment.”

Each category of economic loss is then further defined in R.C. 2743.51(F) through (J), (N), and (O). Notwithstanding these several definitions, R.C. 2743.51(B) defines “collateral source,” in part, as follows:

“(B) `Collateral source’ means a source of benefits or advantages for economic loss otherwise reparable that the victim or claimant has received, or that is readily available to him, from any of the following sources[.]” (Emphasis added.)

Allowable expense, work loss, replacement services loss, dependent’s economic loss, dependent’s replacement services loss, funeral expense, and unemployment benefits loss comprise economic loss. Thus, any “excess” of categorically specific collateral source benefits may and should be used to offset other categories of incurred economic loss.

From review of the file, with full consideration given to the oral argument presented at the hearing, this panel finds the finding of fact and conclusions of law of the single commissioner fail to properly address the issues and interpret the law. Specifically, we find that any overpayment or excess of categorically specific collateral source benefits must be set off as recoupment against other categories of incurred economic loss. In other words, the total of collateral source benefits must be set off against the total economic loss to determine whether an award is authorized. Therefore, the July 30, 1992 determination of the single commissioner is overruled and shall be set aside.

The Attorney General found the applicant had incurred unreimbursed allowable expense in the amount of $706.63 and received an overpayment of work loss benefits in the amount of $165.18. In accordance with the foregoing determination, this overpayment shall be set off against the applicant’s total economic loss ($706.63 — $165.18 = $541.45) for an award in the amount of $541.45 to be rendered in the order entered concurrently.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The July 30, 1992 order of the single commissioner is SET ASIDE;

2. Judgment is rendered against the state of Ohio and the Office of Budget and Management as its agency for payment of the award in the amount of $541.45;

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3. The Clerk shall certify this judgment to the Director of the Office of Budget and Management for payment to the applicant pursuant to R.C. 2743.191;

4. This award is expressly conditioned upon the subrogation provisions of R.C. 2743.72, which require any benefits or advantages received from any collateral sources, including the offender, be repaid to the state of Ohio;

5. This order is entered without prejudice to the applicant’s right to file a supplemental reparations application pursuant to R.C. 2743.60(D) or R.C. 2743.68;

6. Costs be assumed by the reparations fund.

So ordered.

WILLIAM A. CARROLL, STEVEN A. LARSON and DALE A. THOMPSON, Commissioners, concur.

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