485 N.E.2d 715
No. 85-308Supreme Court of Ohio.
Decided November 27, 1985.
Workers’ compensation — Appellate procedure — Overruling of motion to dismiss an R.C. 4123.519 appeal is not a final, appealable order.
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County.
On February 26, 1976, appellant, Chloe Intrieri, sustained a back injury while employed by appellee, Ohio Edison Company (hereinafter referred to as “Ohio Edison”). Her workers’ compensation claim was allowed and she received temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses.
On January 19, 1983, appellant filed an application to reactivate her claim seeking authorization for further medical treatment and a change of physician. The district hearing officer granted the application for change of physician effective on the date the application was filed and authorized payment for treatment two times a month for a period of six months. Ohio Edison appealed that decision to the Canton Regional Board of Review which vacated the district hearing officer’s order. The claimant then appealed to the Industrial Commission which vacated the order of the regional board of review and reinstated the district hearing officer’s order.
Ohio Edison then filed an appeal from the Industrial Commission’s order in the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County. Appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled. Appellant then appealed the trial
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court’s order overruling the motion to dismiss to the court of appeals. That court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.
The court of appeals, finding its judgment to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County i Bratcher v. Hospitality Motor Inns (March 2, 1982), Guernsey App. No. 667, unreported, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.
Roderick, Myers Linton and Kenneth R. Davis, for appellee.
Elliott, Heller Maas and Steven D. Maas, for appellant.
Per Curiam.
The issue certified in this case is whether an order overruling a motion to dismiss an appeal filed under R.C. 4123.519 is a final, appealable order. We addressed this issue in Ferrell v Standard Oil Co. (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 169, and held at the syllabus:
“An order overruling a motion to dismiss an appeal to the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. 4123.519 is not a final, appealable order within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02.”
In reaching this determination, we specifically rejected the arguments advanced by appellant herein that an appeal under R.C. 4123.519 is a “special proceeding” and that the overruling of a motion to dismiss in such a case is one “affecting a substantial right.” Id. at 170-171.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., SWEENEY, WISE, HOLMES, PATTON, DOUGLAS and WRIGHT, JJ., concur.
WISE, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for LOCHER, J.
PATTON, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for C. BROWN, J.
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